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A PROPOSAL FOR EARLY INTERACTIVE
THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION AT THE USPTO
I. INTRODUCTION

Currently, various procedures exist at the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") that expand the options for
third parties to challenge patents beyond solely resorting to
litigation, which is often both time consuming and expensive. One
of the most important public policy reasons for implementing such
procedures is that third party participation can help decrease the
number of "bad patents" that issue because examiners miss or
misunderstand prior art references, and thus, reduce the negative
effects that these patents have on the patent system and on
innovation.' While existing procedures may be useful in some
contexts, not a single existing procedure facilitates meaningful
third party participation early in the patent process at a low cost to
the public and third parties. Allowing third parties to participate in
patent examination after the first Office Action or the applicant's
response to it would provide timing and cost benefits absent from
current procedures and efficiently improve patent quality.
This article sets forth a proposal designed to facilitate and
encourage useful third party participation early on in patent
prosecution by incorporating the best features of current USPTO
third party procedures into a pre-issue submission procedure.
Specifically, the procedure would allow third parties to submit
1. This proposal is designed to prevent issuance of patents that do not meet
the current requirements for patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006),
not patents that are legally valid but considered vague, noncreative, or
problematic, which have been discussed significantly elsewhere. Third parties,
especially competitors, are more likely to have invalidating information and to
understand the state of the art than patent examiners, and thus, using their
resources will help to ensure the validity of issued patents. See Robert P.
Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
614-15 (2002) ("We need to design a system that better taps into patent validity
information, much of which is in private hands ... [or] the quality of patents
will not improve.").
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prior art and respond to an applicant's arguments or examiner's
findings during a limited period after the first Office Action or
response. Like Inter partes reexamination,2 this would allow for
an interactive dialogue with the examiner, but unlike Inter partes
reexamination, significant resources and estoppel would not be
required. To provide the basis for this proposal, Part II of this
article reviews current third party participation at the USPTO,
including Protests, existing third party submissions, Ex parte
reexamination, and Inter partes reexamination. Part III discusses
details of the proposal, including the submission period, substance
of submissions, and necessary revisions to existing law. Part IV
describes specific advantages of this proposal over current
procedures, including low cost interactive participation without the
disincentive of estoppel provisions, increasing the certainty of
patent rights, and keeping both asserted and non-asserted bad
patents out of the patent system. Part V responds to potential
criticisms of the proposal, including possible abuse of the
procedure, longer prosecution time, and lack of participation
incentive. Finally, Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND

Some background information on the strengths and weaknesses
of current procedures at the USPTO is necessary to fully
understand the benefits of this proposal. This section will review
Protests, current third party submissions, and Ex parte and Inter
partes reexaminations.
A. Protests
Filing a Protest is one of the only existing outlets for third
parties to participate during the examination process, but this
participation is limited. Most importantly, because Protests cannot
be filed after publication or notice of allowance without consent
from the applicant, Protests are practically limited to third parties
2. See infra notes 10 through 18 and accompanying text for discussion on
Interpartes reexamination.
3. 37 C.F.R. § 1.291(b) (2010).
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who were familiar with the invention before the application was
filed. Even for those parties, Protests are limited in scope to only
(1) a listing of the patents, publications, or other information relied
upon and (2) an explanation of the relevance of these items.'
B. Third Party Submissions
Third party submissions to the USPTO are currently limited to
ten total patents or publications without any explanation or other
information.! While this procedure allows third parties to bring art
to the attention of the examiner, it does not allow any further
interaction with the examiner or applicant. In fact, the procedure
is specifically structured in this way to "avoid compromising the
objectivity of the ex parte character of the examination process."6
Thus, the process is discouraging for competitors, who have no
opportunity to explain their position, and favorable to applicants,
who have significant opportunities to explain away any art that is
brought before the examiner during prosecution.
C. Reexamination
After patent issuance, third parties also have some limited right
to challenge validity, prior to or concurrently with litigation,
through Ex parte or Interpartes reexaminations.
Ex parte reexamination is limited to issues raised by prior art
patents and printed publications.' It requires a "substantial new
4. Id. § 1.291(c). Also required are copies of each item or the relevant
portion of it; English translations; and, if the Protest is a second or subsequent
Protest by the same party in interest, an explanation as to why the issue(s) raised
in the second or subsequent Protest are significantly different than those raised
earlier and why the significantly different issue(s) were not presented earlier.
Id.
5. Id. § 1.99(d).
6. See Changes to Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of Patent
Applications, 65 Fed. Reg. 57024, 57042 cmt. 29 (Sept. 20, 2000).
7. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (2006); 37 C.F.R.§l.552(a) (2010); M.P.E.P. § 2256
(2010). The PTO will not consider patentability or invalidity issues other than
those based on patents or printed publications. 37 C.F.R. § 1.552(c); M.P.E.P. §
2258.
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question of patentability,"' and while it does not include estoppel
provisions, participation is limited to the initial submission.'
Inter partes reexamination allows more interactive third party
involvement with reexamination of issued patents. Once Inter
partes reexamination is granted based on "a substantial new
question of patentability,"' 0 the USPTO will send Office Actions
similar to those presented during initial examination, to which the
patent owner may respond with arguments, amendments, or new
claims." However, unlike initial examination, the third party
requester may file written comments to the examiner in reply to
every patent owner response.1
Statistics show that third parties have succeeded in Inter partes
reexamination, with 49% of them resulting in all claims being
cancelled and 43% resulting in claim changes." Thus, by allowing
third parties to interact with the examiner and applicant, Inter
partes reexamination may provide the level playing field necessary
for third parties to meaningfully contribute to validity
determinations without resorting to litigation. However, Inter
partes reexamination is a lengthy proceeding that consumes
significant resources, requiring a special panel of experienced
examiners at the USPTO called the Central Reexamination Unit
("CRU"),14an average pendency of nearly three years," and costs

8. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 304, 312.
9. The original request may accordingly include, among other things,
declarations from persons of ordinary skill in the art to explain the contents or
pertinent dates of prior art patents or publications. See M.P.E.P. § 2205.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 312(a).
11. See id.§ 314(b).
12. Id.
13. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION

FILING DATA - JUNE 30, 2010 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/

patents/stats/IPquarterlyreport Dec_2010.pdf. Compare these numbers with
Ex parte reexaminations initiated by third parties, in which all claims are
cancelled only 13% of time and revised claims are issued 62% of the time. See
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXPARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA -

available
(2010),
2010
30,
JUNE
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/EPquarterlyreport-Dec_2010.pdf.
14. See M.P.E.P. § 2226.

at

15. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 13.
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to participants that can rival those of initial patent prosecution.'6
Because of this, serious estoppel provisions are required to prevent
abuse; once a final decision has been entered against a party and
the party has not sustained its burden of proving invalidity of any
patent claim in-suit, then neither that party nor its privies may
thereafter request Inter partes reexamination of any such patent
claim on the basis of issues that the party, or its privies, raised or
could have raised in the prior action." These estoppel provisions
have discouraged participation, and even the USPTO has
suggested that revision or clarification of estoppel provisions
would be helpful."
However, so long as Inter partes
reexamination maintains its complex character, some form of
estoppel will be necessary to prevent abuse.
III. PROPOSED PROCEDURE

Because of the success rate of Inter partes reexamination, this
proposal attempts to take advantage of the successful interactive
features of that procedure at an earlier stage in the patent process,
at a lower cost, and with a higher participation rate. The proposed
procedure would provide a limited period for third parties to
respond to either the examiner's first Office Action or the
applicant's response to that Office Action by submitting
documents with explanations and/or arguments for a low fee
without risking estoppel.
A. Proposal
The procedure would look similar to a Protest but with the
interactive features of Inter partes reexamination and a different
period for submission. The time period for submission would

16. A fee of $8,800 is required just to file an Inter partes reexamination, and
each party also has patent prosecution costs. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(c)(2), 1.915(a)
(2010).
17. See id. § 1.907(b).
18. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER
PARTES REEXAMINATION (2004), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/

offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam report.htm.
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begin when the examiner sends out the first Office Action on the
merits, which includes either a notice of allowance or a substantive
rejection of the applicant's claims. At that time, a third party
would have the information necessary to create a meaningful
response to the examiner. 9 In addition to responding to the
examiner's comments, if the application is rejected, and the third
party waits for the applicant's response to that rejection, the
proposal would allow the third party to respond to and to attack the
applicant's arguments as well.20
If the first Office Action includes a notice of allowance, then
third parties would have three months from that notice of
allowance to make submissions. If, instead, it includes a rejection,
the submission period would end three months after the applicant's
response to the rejection. The three month response period would
be equitable, given that applicants have that long to respond during
prosecution.2' However, three months is short enough to avoid
flooding the examiner or extensively lengthening prosecution. The
submission procedure is not designed to be long and extensive like
Inter partes reexamination, but to provide a short window for
participation at the right time during prosecution.
As part of the submission, the third party should include
documents relied upon and an explanation of their relevance.
Further, third parties should be allowed to submit arguments on the
merits in support of or against a patent examiner's or applicant's
position, or in response to either party's understanding of the prior
19. The first Office Action reveals what prior art the examiner used to reject
claims, what prior art he allowed the claims over, the examiner's understanding
of the prior art and the claims, and more. See M.P.E.P. Appendix R § 1.104
(2010).
20. Of course, under current practice, third parties cannot view the first
Office Action and the applicant's response until after the USPTO publishes the
application, which usually occurs after 18 months under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)
(2006). See infra notes 25 through 27 and accompanying text for further
discussion of the practical consequences of current publication rules.
21. See M.P.E.P § 710.02(b). This time period is, in fact, even longer than
the one month response period given to third parties in Inter partes
reexamination. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(b). However, it should be longer, given
that, unlike Inter partes reexamination, third party involvement ends at the
beginning of prosecution rather than continuing throughout the prosecution
process.
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art. This takes into account that third party competitors might
better understand the cited art or have access to art unavailable to
the examiner. Initially, the third party submission procedure
should end here, but if results are positive, expansion to
subsequent Office Actions might be warranted.
A fee should be collected to discourage frivolous submissions.
This fee should be significantly lower than reexamination fees to
encourage parties to choose this low cost procedure over
reexamination. The low fee also reflects that this procedure
requires limited additional USPTO resources, with the exception
of processing costs and extra reading for the examiner.
If the patent issues despite the submission, the submitter should
not be estopped from making the same argument in a later
proceeding. Because these submissions are limited in time and in
scope to the first Office Action and response, strong estoppel
provisions are simply not necessary. Also, logically, estoppel
should not apply, because the submission is made as part of the
normal course of examination and does not create a further
proceeding; the third party is bringing information before the
examiner that the examiner should see to fully review the
application. Absent strict estoppel, the presumption of validity
still helps ensure that judges who revisit the examiner's decision to
issue a patent over submitted art and arguments will do so with
some deference to that prior decision.
B. Implementation
Before this procedure could be implemented, Congress would
have to revise the current code to lift its ban on pre-issuance
opposition after publication. Specifically, 35 U.S.C. § 122(c)
states that "[t]he Director shall establish appropriate procedures to
ensure that no protest or other form of pre-issuance opposition to
the grant of a patent on an application may be initiated after
publication of the application without the express written consent
of the applicant." 22 Given this direct conflict with current law as
well as patent law's emphasis on preserving ex parte patent

22. 35 U.S.C. § 122(c).
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examination,2 3 Congress would be better suited to implement the
proposed procedure by statute rather than the USPTO through
regulation because of the high risk that such a regulation from the
USPTO would be considered ultra vires.24
In addition, current law provides that, absent special
circumstances or a request from the applicant in conjunction with a
commitment not to file in other countries that require publication,
all applications publish promptly after eighteen months, and
correspondence between the USPTO and the applicant is
publically available thereafter.25 In most cases, this would be early
enough to precede the first Office Action, as the average pendency
of the first Office Action is 25.7 months.26 For the limited number
of applications in which the first Office Action issues prior to
publication, the three month window for a submission after the
applicant's response to first Office Action could be substituted
with a submission period of three months after first publication.2 7
One drawback of this proposal is that it could potentially cause
more applicants to elect to keep their applications secret and
forego foreign filings. However, in most cases, if the patents are
potentially valuable, applicants will prefer to keep their option for
foreign filing, and this additional procedure is unlikely to deter that
preference.
IV. BENEFITS OF PRE-GRANT/POST-OFFICE ACTION SUBMISSION
The benefits of encouraging third party participation in the

23. See id; see also Changes to Implement Eighteen-Month Publication of
Patent Applications, 65 Fed. Reg. 57024, 57042 cmt. 29 (Sept. 20, 2000).
24. Most current third party procedures, including protests, Ex parte
reexamination, and Interpartes reexamination, are implemented by the USPTO
based on statutory authority. See supra notes 3 through 10 and accompanying
text.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
26. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR
2010 USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2010), available

at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf.
27. To prevent prosecution delays, an applicant can elect for early
publication under 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
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patent system are numerous, 28 but the procedure described above
would be particularly advantageous over existing procedures.
Most importantly, it would (1) allow for the interactivity of Inter
partes reexamination without the cost and estoppel provisions that
discourage participation, (2) increase certainty of patent rights to
the public and patentees, and (3) reduce the number of both
asserted and non-asserted bad patents.
A. A Lower Pricefor InteractiveParticipation

As discussed above, this procedure allows third parties to
interactively participate in patent prosecution after the first Office
Action and response at a lower cost for everybody involved. For
the USPTO, no special panel, like the CRU, is necessary: the
information and arguments are simply submitted to the examiner,
who is already examining the application. For the parties, while
initial examination costs might be increased for patentees, the
reward for both parties is a cheaper, easier, and less time
consuming process than reexamination or litigation at a later date.
In addition, the fee for third party requestors would be minimal
compared to existing procedures that allow interactive
involvement.
Further, the procedure allows for interactivity without the
significant threat of estoppel that has discouraged parties from
using Inter partes reexamination. Third parties would have less to
lose by submitting art now because their arguments would be
preserved for reexamination or litigation.
B. IncreasedCertaintyfor the Public and Patentees

This proposal also helps prevent the USPTO from issuing
patents that should not be issued. Third parties, as competitors, are
more likely than patent examiners to have invalidating information
and to understand the state of the art. Thus, using their resources
28. These include benefits to the public, competitors, and even the patentee.
See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the
Market and How Should We Change? - The Private and Social Costs of
Patents,55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006).
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will help to ensure the patents that issue are actually valid. 29 No
amount of database searching can turn up all of the relevant
information for a patent examiner, considering that some of that
information is solely in the hands the patentee, his competitors, or
other private parties.30 Allowing third party submissions and
encouraging them with a procedure that allows genuine
involvement in examination with minimal effort helps to reduce
the information imbalance between the USPTO examiner and the
applicant. With better patents, the public can be more certain that
patents are valid and conduct research and development, as well as
licensing negotiations, accordingly.
Advocates of strong patent rights might initially be opposed to
this submission system, but they should keep in mind that the
system also benefits patentees. More rigorous scrutiny at the
USPTO through third party submissions and arguments will give
patentees better assurance that issued patents will hold up in court,
even if examination is initially more difficult.3 1 Encouraging early
disclosure from third parties also benefits the patentee by reducing
the risk that prior art or other information will come to light to
invalidate the patent after the patentee has invested resources into
a patented product. Moreover, the patentee has the benefit of
revising claims in response to the third party information during
prosecution, potentially resulting in issuance of stronger claims,
and such revision becomes more difficult and costly after patent
issuance.
C. PreventingBad PatentsEarlier
This more extensive pre-grant third party procedure could also
be better than post-grant procedures at preventing the "chilling"
effect for patents that are improperly issued, even including those
that are never asserted. Because third parties use the threat of

29. See Merges, supra note 1.
30. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patents System,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 767 (2002) ("Hence, the Patent Office is unlikely
to be well informed about the relevant prior art, creating an asymmetry between
the patentee's ihformation and the information possessed by the Patent Office.").
31. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 28 at 109.
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reexamination as a bargaining tool, reexaminations are typically
initiated by third parties after a patent is asserted, when licensing
negotiations break down or when litigation is initiated. Thus,
reexamination does little to address the problem of patents that
prevent competition by their mere existence, even if never
asserted.32
V. RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS.
The proposed system, like any proposal, has its flaws. Opening
the patent system to interactive, low cost third party participation
creates opportunity for abuse. Because the procedure requires
limited resources, third parties might attempt to delay prosecution
by submitting frivolous claims in high volume. In Japan, for
example, pre-grant oppositions were eliminated because of such
abuse." To address this problem, the proposal, while broader than
current pre-grant procedures, is not a full opposition system for
third parties but is instead limited to only responses to the first
Office Action. Limiting the submission period also addresses
these concerns by setting a deadline for submissions. In addition,
the USPTO could limit submissions by a single party, or the
quantity of total submissions, to prevent overload for the examiner.
Similarly, significant third party submissions, or in some cases,
even a single submission, may result in increased delays prior to

32. Even issued patents that are not asserted can negatively affect innovation
and competition. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REv. 101 (2006).
Competitors who sell potentially infringing products face potential liability for
significant damages, litigation costs, or reexamination costs. These competitors
might choose to avoid a market or wastefully design around a patent prior to
entry when that market is occupied by a patent, regardless of patent validity.
See id.
33. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 28 at 110 ("[In Japan,] the change to a
post-grant system was the result of complaints and a strong lobby by American
firms that felt Japanese firms were using the pre-grant system to block their
inventions."). Germany and the United Kingdom restricted or eliminated pregrant opposition for similar reasons.
See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking
Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S.
PatentLaw, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 116-17 & n.512 (1997).
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patent issuance, and thus, a reduced patent term.34 In many
situations, this loss of term is harmless, or minimally harmful
when compared to the many benefits of allowing third party
However, within certain
submissions discussed above.
technological fields, such as pharmaceuticals, every day of patent
term can be worth millions of dollars," and as such, any proposal
that delays patent issuance can cause very real problems and will
face very serious opposition. Existing laws that allow for patent
term adjustment based on delay by the USPTO would potentially
apply in some circumstances, and if necessary, these laws could be
revised to include specific provisions that make adjustments for
delays that occur due to this new third party submission
procedure."
While the potential exists for third parties to flood the system,
the potential also exists for the opposite problem; parties might not
provide submissions at all. Part of the incentive for parties to
participate after the first Office Action and response is that
interested parties can understand how the examiner and the
applicant view the application at that time.
Consequently,
challengers will be able to assess the quality of the prior art they
possess compared to the Patent Office's cited prior art, and
therefore, make an informed decision about mounting a pre-grant
challenge.
34. Patent term is calculated from the filing date rather than the issue date:
the term of a patent begins "on the date on which the patent issues and end[s] 20
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the
United States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an earlier
filed application or applications under section 120, 121, or 365(c) of this [Title
35], from the date on which the earliest such application was filed." 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(2) (2006).
35. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Coalition Seeks to Curb Drug Patent
Extensions, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=
(stating
that
drug
&contentld=A12031-2002Mar24&notFound=true
manufacturer AstraZeneca collected $5.6 million in revenue each day that the
patent for the drug Prilosec remained enforceable).
36. For example, the USPTO currently allows for patent term adjustment due
to delayed responses from the examiner, failure to act upon an application, or
lengthy overall pendency because of action or inaction from the USPTO. 35
U.S.C. § 154(b).
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A third party might also choose to participate because the
program allows more broad participation than Ex parte
reexamination, like Inter partes reexamination, but without
estoppel. Third parties have less to lose by submitting art now,
with their arguments still being preserved for reexamination or
litigation. Further, positive participation numbers in pre-grant
third party programs currently being tested by the USPTO indicate
that encouraging participation may not be a problem at all."
Thus, while the system is not flawless, options exist to reduce its
flaws and its potential benefits outweigh potential drawbacks.
VI. CONCLUSION

Third party participation after the first Office Action or response
would provide significant rewards at a minimal cost to the parties
and the patent system. This article proposes a submission process
that allows third parties to submit prior art and respond to an
applicant's arguments or examiner's findings in the first Office
Action and response for a low fee and without the threat of
estoppel.
This proposal would encourage third parties to
interactively participate in patent prosecution and improve the
quality of issued patents.
Justin J. Lesko

37. The Peer to Patent project pilot, for example, attracted more the 2600
reviewers by 2009.

ALLEN, ET. AL, PEER TO PATENT SECOND ANNIVERSARY

REPORT 5 (June 2009), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/
CPI P2PYearTwo hi.pdf. Because early disclosure is good for the USPTO, a
more radical solution could be a "patent bounty" to award submissions that
prove to be useful to the examiner. See generally John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposalfor Patent Bounties,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305 (2001) (describing a "Patent Bounty" to reward third
parties who offer invalidating information to the USPTO).
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